Saint Louis University School of Law

Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship

2012

The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law:
Returning to the Theory of the Firm
Matthew T. Bodie
Saint Louis University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bodie, Matthew T., The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the Theory of the Firm (Summer 2012). Seattle
University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2012.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.

The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law:
Returning to the Theory of the Firm
Matthew T. Bodie∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate law academia has an established story about the transformation of the field—a revolution, in fact—that took place in the 1970s
and 1980s. According to the traditional narrative, what was once a
swampy doctrinal backwater became a vibrant hub of intellectual activity
through the new methodology of law and economics.1 Economic theory
introduced such concepts as agency costs, the market for corporate control, and shareholder primacy—concepts that in turn became the dominant framework for the corporate law and theory of today. Some scholars
have characterized this revolution as the “end of history” of corporate
law: namely, an international consensus on the corporation’s basic structure and principles.2
The consensus on corporate law theory has narrowed the field’s
doctrinal and methodological foci. Although the vibrancy of shareholder
primacy has at times been called into question as a matter of law,3 both
boardrooms and courts have taken the normative call for shareholder
wealth maximization increasingly to heart. There is little doubt that the
revolution has not only substantially affected legal theory but also legislation,4 court decisions,5 and corporate behavior.6 It achieved a level of
∗

Professor and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Saint Louis University
School of Law. Many thanks to Chuck O’Kelley, Julie McClure, and the Seattle University Law
Review for putting on such a terrific conference.
1. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342 (2005).
2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 439 (2001) (arguing that the shareholder-centered model has achieved dominance “among the
business, government, and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions”).
3. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 284–88 (1998); Lynn
A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 168–72 (2008).
4. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2011) (limiting the corporate deduction for nonincentivebased executive pay to $1 million); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009) (expressly authorizing
corporations to provide bylaw provisions that would permit proxy access and to impose any lawful
condition on the access provision).
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success unusual for an academic discipline; it not only transformed the
field but also the world.
We now find ourselves in the post-revolutionary period. For some
academics, it is time to refine the revolutionary principles and attend to
the subsidiary issues that are left to be worked out.7 But for me, it is time
to look forward to the next revolution. This Essay argues that corporate
law academics should look to the economic literature on the theory of the
firm in taking those next steps. The fundamental question about corporate law is not how to manage the relationships between shareholders,
directors, and executives; instead, it is why we have created and sustained corporations in the first place. In going back to basic principles,
we need to ask ourselves the following question: Why do we have firms,
rather than markets? And how do corporations serve our needs for firms?
Can the model be improved? Are there other models to consider?
Fortunately, we have a robust existing literature seeking to answer
at least some of these questions. The question of firms versus markets
was famously posed by Ronald Coase in The Nature of the Firm,8 and
the economic literature on the theory of the firm has grown (in fits and
starts) over time to flesh out his work. Although the law and economics
revolution gave lip service to this literature, in fact, it has largely been
marginalized.9 It is time to begin incorporating this body of research
more directly into corporate law, and to start a new revolution that reexamines many of the basic principles of the earlier law and economics
upheaval.
Part II of this Essay explores the law and economics revolution and
discusses the different levels of attention to the finance and theory of the
firm literatures. Part III sets out the basics of the theory of the firm literature. Part IV discusses how several significant strands of corporate law
scholarship have already incorporated the theory of the firm literature.
5. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hile
the board of directors of a corporation that is a target or potential target of hostile tender offers has
the power to adopt a poison pill, the particular poison pill it adopts must be reasonably related to the
goal of shareholder wealth maximization.”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1,
34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by
the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”).
6. See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J.
CORP. L. 975, 985–89 (2006) (discussing the importance of stock price to the stock options mania of
the late 1990s).
7. Romano, supra note 1, at 355–56 (describing how empirical research based on established
economic models is now more important than new efforts at modeling).
8. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), available at http://on
linelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x/pdf.
9. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV.
727, 732 (2004) (“[T]he theory of the firm has played a minor role in law and economics.”).
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Finally, Part V explores two potential avenues for inquiry and connection
moving forward: the role of employees in corporate law, and connections
with business and organizational theory academics.
II. THE LOPSIDED LAW AND ECONOMICS REVOLUTION IN
CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
Sadly, it is unusual for academics to offer stand-alone chronicles of
the changes within their field.10 Roberta Romano’s After the Revolution
in Corporate Law,11 on the other hand, takes up this task with zest and
incisiveness. Her article opens:
Corporate law is a field that underwent as thorough a revolution in
the 1980s as can be imagined, in scholarship and practice, methodology and organization. The term “revolution” is invoked all too often in popular culture, but as this article will suggest, it is entirely
apt in this case. The revolution in corporate law has been so thorough and profound that those working in the field today would have
considerable difficulty recognizing what it was twenty-five to thirty
years ago.12

Much of Romano’s history is familiar rhetorical ground: the “ossified,
stagnant” state of corporate law in the 1960s;13 the early work of pioneers such as Henry Manne14 and Ralph Winter;15 and the wave of law
and economics scholarship that transformed the field in the 1980s. Rather than a simple string of successive cites, however, her article seeks to
single out the specific aspects of the revolution that were critical to its
success. She identifies three distinct “strands” to this transformation:
modern finance theory, work on the theory of the firm, and the boom in
hostile takeovers in the 1980s. The first strand imported concepts such as
the efficient capital market and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
into business law theory and doctrine.16 The second strand introduced
transaction cost economics and agency costs theory to corporate law,
building on the earlier work of Berle and Means.17 Finally, the relevance
10. The exception is the critical legal studies movement, which may have overanalyzed itself
into dissolution. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1984).
11. Romano, supra note 1.
12. Id. at 342.
13. Id. at 343.
14. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965).
15. See Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
16. Romano, supra note 1, at 344–46.
17. Id. at 347. Berle and Means famously suggested that the modern corporation experienced a
separation of ownership (shareholders) from control (management) because of, among other things,
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of these theories was demonstrated in practice when buyouts and other
novel transaction techniques exploded across the business landscape.
These three strands—finance, firm, and takeover mania—created the
new law and economics approach to corporate law and theory.
Romano goes into significant detail on the role of modern finance
theory in shaping the transformation. The portfolio theory of investment
decision-making, irrelevance theories of firm capital structure and valuation, and CAPM provided the intellectual architecture for the notion that
the corporation represented a somewhat fungible mass of investment signals.18 And those signals were relatively straightforward to study. Romano notes that finance “differs from many other fields of economics because it has a decidedly empirical focus.”19 Through event studies, which
measured the effect of certain “events” on share prices, scholars could
study the efficiency of state governance statutes, federal legislation, and
international regulatory regimes.20 Thus, finance brought together a theory having a relatively straightforward normative agenda—namely, the
overall maximization of share price—with a methodology for testing results against that agenda.
Romano also cites to the importance of the theory of the firm to the
corporate law revolution but spends considerably less of her discussion
on it. Romano discusses the advances in the economics of the firm and
specifies two lines of research in this regard: transaction cost economics
and agency cost theory.21 Citing to Williamson for the former22 and Jensen and Meckling for the latter,23 Romano argues that these two developments had a “lasting impact on the thinking of corporate law academics.”24 She acknowledges that agency costs theory stemmed from Berle
and Means’s work on the separation of ownership and control, but argues
that the theory was redeveloped from the corporate finance literature and
was later “mathematicized and refined by economists.”25

the weakness of the proxy voting system. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 3–7 (1932).
18. Romano, supra note 1, at 344–46.
19. Id. at 346.
20. See, e.g., Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1857 (2007) (studying the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on share prices).
21. Romano, supra note 1, at 347.
22. Id. (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975)).
23. Romano, supra note 1, at 347 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976)).
24. Romano, supra note 1, at 347.
25. Id.
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Although the theory of the firm research is important enough to
Romano that she lists it as a coequal strand with finance theory, her program for the future better demonstrates her actual balance on the two
subjects.26 She suggests that aspiring corporate law professors would be
better served by a background in finance than a background in economics. Graduate economics programs focus more on theory and formal
modeling, while finance tends to use empirical tools. These empirical
tools, argues Romano, were more likely to “facilitate the sorting out of
theories” than would further research based on modeling.27 Noting that
empirical work depended on a consensus on the ends of a particular policy or regulatory scheme, she claims that most corporate law scholars
agreed that the objective of publicly held corporations was to maximize
the overall wealth of shareholders.28 Given these ends, event studies
could be employed to determine which policies increased share prices
and thereby maximized shareholder wealth.
Finance has indeed become the most important outside discipline in
the contemporary study of corporate law. Sophisticated number crunching of stock prices has become a critical—perhaps even the dominant—
analytical tool for today’s corporate law scholar.29 Academics have employed event studies to address some of the thorniest issues in corporate
law theory, such as the efficiency of state corporate law,30 staggered
boards,31 federal securities and state derivative suit litigation,32 independ-

26. Indeed, Romano referred to both when discussing the focus of the law and economics
reforms. See id. at 348 (“Modern finance and the new economic theories of the firm provided the
analytical tools for understanding the new deals transforming corporate law practice in the
1980s . . . .”); id. at 351 (“As takeovers flourished, those deals set the teaching and research agenda,
and finance and the theory of the firm provided the tools for analyzing the deals and the novel legal
issues they raised.”); id. (“Modern finance and the theory of the firm offered plausible theories of
investor and manager behavior and therefore quickly came to be pervasive in analyses of corporate
law.”).
27. Id. at 356.
28. Id.
29. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 639 (2006) (citing Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of Empirical
Research in Corporate Law Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981, 982–83 (2004)).
30. Compare Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525
(2001) (finding that Delaware firms had higher value than firms incorporated elsewhere), with
Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 46 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57 (2004) (failing to find higher value).
31. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887
(2002).
32. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less in Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007); Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (2011).
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ent directors,33 and executive compensation.34 Legislation such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act35 and the Dodd-Frank Act36 has been judged based
on its grounding (or lack thereof) in empirical research.37 Even the courts
have gotten into the act; the D.C. Circuit has referred to the empirical
literature in addressing whether the SEC had demonstrated sufficient
support for its independent mutual fund chairpersons and proxy-access
rules.38
This growing use of empirical study of stock prices in answering
corporate law’s questions has generated a growing level of criticism.
First, the efficiency of market prices has been called into question by a
roller-coaster ride of share prices, particularly the calamitous drop in late
2008. Market stalwarts such as Alan Greenspan admitted that the models
for efficient capital markets did not accurately reflect reality.39 Although
corporate law scholars have emphasized the need to focus on long-term
shareholder value,40 the reliance on short-term event studies contradicts
that caution. Second, the notion that share value represents overall societal efficiency has been questioned not only by progressive scholars but

33. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002). Roberta Romano has criticized the requirements of audit-committee independence within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act based on her review of
the existing empirical literature. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–33 (2005). For an overview of this issue, see
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950−2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2007).
34. For a review of the empirical evidence, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004).
35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
36. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
37. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1779, 1796–1819 (2011) (criticizing Dodd-Frank for lack of empirical support); Romano,
supra note 33 (criticizing Sarbanes-Oxley for lack of empirical support).
38. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that the SEC
relied on “insufficient empirical data” in formulating its proxy-access rule and pointing to an analysis of event studies as contrary evidence to the proposed rule); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412
F.3d 133, 142–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting the SEC’s dismissal of empirical research on the value of
independent chairpersons on mutual fund performance).
39. Brian Knowlton & Michael M. Grynbaum, Greenspan “Shocked” that Free Markets Are
Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/worldbusiness/23
iht-gspan.4.17206624.html (“I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations,
specifically banks and others, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own
shareholders and their equity in the firms.” (quoting former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan)).
40. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 439 (“There is no longer any serious competitor
to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
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by more mainstream academics as well.41 Proponents of stakeholder theory have jousted with shareholder primacy for some time.42 But the failures of companies such as Enron and WorldCom, and transactions such
as the AOL-Time Warner merger, called the shareholder primacy ethos
into doubt.43 The 2008 financial crisis compounded this doubt. Although
shareholder primacy is not dead by any stretch, it has suffered a series of
blows that render it open to serious question.
Research on the theory of the firm, on the other hand, has been relatively unplumbed in corporate law. Although Romano asserts that the
economics on the theory of the firm has had “a lasting impact” on corporate law scholars, it is really only the literature on agency costs analysis
that has had any substantial development. Certainly, Jensen and
Meckling’s Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure shaped much of the subsequent literature on the
corporation and the roles of shareholders, managers, and directors within
the corporation.44 Their article developed the nexus-of-contracts theory,
which argues that the firm is merely a central hub for a series of contractual relationships. As discussed later in the paper,45 however, this approach is not a theory of the firm, but rather a theory of agency costs
within the firm.46 The nexus-of-contracts paradigm isolates corporate
law, as it “leaves corporate law focused entirely on financial transactions
that are cut off from the primary strategic operating transactions of the
corporation.”47

41. See Fisch, supra note 29, at 638 (challenging “the foundations of using the shareholder
primacy norm to judge corporate law”).
42. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST
EXPORT (2001) (arguing that the “main problem with American corporations—the main cause of
their irresponsibility—is their drive to maximize short-term stock prices”). See generally
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
43. Bodie, supra note 6.
44. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 23, at 308.
45. See infra Part IV.A.
46. See Thomas McInerney, Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 135, 137–38 (“Scholars working in this paradigm do not offer theories of the firm so
much as theories of who controls the firm.”); Meurer, supra note 9, at 728 (noting “some confusion”
about the difference between agency theory and the theory of the firm); Edward B. Rock & Michael
L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2001) (“Jensen and Meckling, despite the title, did not really offer a
full-fledged theory of the firm. Rather, they offered a theory of agency costs within firms . . . .”); see
also Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1764 (1989) (“[T]he nexus of contracts approach does less to resolve the questions of what a firm is
than to shift the terms of the debate. In particular, it leaves open the question of why particular
‘standard forms’ are chosen. Perhaps more fundamentally, it begs the question of what limits the set
of activities covered by a ‘standard form.’”).
47. Rock & Wachter, supra note 46, at 1629.
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So there is much left to explore when it comes to the economic theory of the firm. The next section endeavors to sketch (with broad strokes)
an overview of this literature.
III. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM IN BRIEF
The research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a fundamental question: Why do we even have firms at all? The function of
markets is to allocate resources based on the best information available at
the time.48 Firms, however, operate outside of this market structure,
standing like “lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.”49 The
law reflects this differentiation, as market transactions are generally governed by contract, while firms are created as specific business organizations—partnerships, corporations, LLCs, among others. Why have we
created the non-market, non-contractual entities in the first place? Why
not just rely on markets and contracts for everything?
Early economists did not seek to answer this question, but rather relied on a placeholder to serve their modeling needs. The firm was simply
a black box that took in inputs and put out outputs. The first modern effort to inquire into the nature of firms was The Nature of the Firm.50 In
that article, Coase framed the issue in this manner:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.
Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated, and in place
of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is
substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production. It
is clear that these are alternative methods of coordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that, if production is regulated by
price movements, production could be carried on without any organization at all, well we might ask, why is there any organization?51

For Coase, the answer is transaction cost economics: organizing production through a market creates transaction costs that a firm can avoid.52
Since the firm consisted of managers and workers, the heart of the firm
was the relationship between these two groups. It was the firm’s ability
to manage workers outside of a market that solved significant pricing and
contracting expenses. As he argued, “it is the fact of direction which is
48. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
49. Coase, supra note 8, at 388 (quoting D. H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85
(1930)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 390–92.
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the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and employee’” as well as
the concept of the firm itself.53
Although the field started slowly, the theory of the firm made significant advancements beginning in the 1970s. Alchian and Demsetz developed a concept of team production that explained the firm not as a
way of providing command and control but as a way of pooling disparate
inputs into a system of cooperative creation.54 They defined team production as “production in which 1) several types of resources are used and 2)
the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”55 Firms are able to coordinate production among various groups
without carving the relationships into separable contracts. As a result,
firms are used when the team method increases productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the various
players. Under Alchian and Demsetz’s model, the primary concern of
team production is making sure that the team members do not shirk their
responsibilities to the team. The inability to measure individual contributions to productivity is what makes the firm useful in the first place, but
it is also the firm’s central governance problem. As a result, an independent monitor is necessary to ensure that the team members all contribute appropriately and are rewarded appropriately. That central monitor is the firm itself.56
Around the same time of Alchain and Demsetz’s work, Oliver Williamson was continuing to develop Coase’s “transaction-costs” model
into a robust field of research. Williamson used the theory of the firm to
identify the types of contractual difficulties that are likely to lead to firm
governance rather than market solutions.57 When contributions and compensation are harder to value individually, the parties will be left with
incomplete and ambiguous contracts. And these contracts will be insufficient to properly allocate economic power within the relationship—
particularly where one or both of the parties must invest significant resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or transaction. In
order to prevent opportunism in the face of these contracts, some system
of governance is necessary to deal with ex ante developments. Firms can
provide this governance. By creating legal structures that allocate control
between the parties separate and apart from their contractual rights, gov53. Id. at 404.
54. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
55. Id. at 779.
56. Id.
57. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Jeffrey T.
Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Work in
the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008).
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ernments can assist parties in developing relationships that minimize
transaction costs and facilitate economic growth.58
The property-rights theory of the firm focuses more particularly on
the assets that the parties seek to use together. This theory, developed in
a series of articles by Grossman, Hart, and Moore, posits that firms serve
as a repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.59 By
owning the property outright, the firm prevents the tragedy of the commons (in which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well
as the problem of the anticommons (in which property rights are divvied
up among too many disparate actors). The Grossman-Hart-Moore model
dictates that the firm should be owned by those who contribute the most
valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint enterprise. While
these types of contributors are crucial to the firm’s success, they are also
the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint enterprise moves
forward in time.60
Building on the property-rights theory of the firm, Rajan and
Zingales have proposed an “access” theory of power within the firm.61
This model defines a firm “both in terms of unique assets (which may be
physical or human) and in terms of the people who have access to these
assets.”62 The power of the individuals within and without the firm is
based on their relative access to the assets, which Rajan and Zingales
define as “the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource.”63 Examples of critical resources include machines, ideas, and people. As Rajan
and Zingales make clear, “[t]he agent who is given privileged access to
the resource gets no new residual rights of control. All she gets is the
opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make
herself valuable.”64 Combined with her right to leave the firm, access
58. WILLIAMSON, supra note 22.
59. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995); Sanford J.
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1121 (1990).
60. In the transaction-cost model, employees may be precisely the vulnerable yet valuable
contributors to the joint enterprise who have the most to fear from opportunistic behavior. Indeed,
Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency of the transactions costs literature has been to
recognize that firm-specific human capital raises similar questions, but then to sidestep the implications of these questions for corporate governance.” Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital
and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66 (Margaret M. Blair &
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
61. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387
(1998).
62. Id. at 390.
63. Id. at 388.
64. Id.
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gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource that she controls: her specialized human capital.”65 Control over this critical resource
is a source of power. Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince the amount
of surplus that she gets from this power is often more contingent on her
making the right specific investment than the surplus that comes from
ownership, access can be a better mechanism to provide incentives than
ownership.”66 Given the importance of access, the role of the firm is to
allocate access efficiently among the firm’s agents.
Other research has focused more specifically on the role of human
capital. The macroeconomic shift from manufacturing to service and creative industries led one set of scholars to develop a knowledge-based
theory of the firm.67 According to the knowledge-based theory, “The way
the firm develops the knowledge it will use in its production process and
the extent that firm can bind this knowledge to its structure will influence
its organizational structure.”68 Rather than emphasize the ownership of
physical assets—which can be fungible and non-specific—the
knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute, and
ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm. Similarly, another approach known as the capability-based theory of the firm
focuses on firm-specific knowledge and learning that can be translated
into joint production.69
These theories of the firm do not lead to the inarguable conclusion
of shareholder primacy. In fact, they seem to point elsewhere. First, it is
important to remember that the “firm” means something different than
corporation. Firms may take one of many different organizational forms:
corporation, partnership, LLPs, LLCs, cooperatives, and non-profits.70 In
fact, these legally created organizational forms should look to the theory
of the firm for justification why they even exist in the first place. But
given the importance of the corporate form to twentieth-century firms, it

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123 (2007).
68. Id. at 1140.
69. McInerney, supra note 46.
70. For a discussion of these forms, see HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE
(1996). Organizational forms must justify their existence in a world of contractual obligation. Of the
organizational forms, partnership comes closest to contract, as it places upon the parties the obligations they would generally assume from a contractual agreement. Partnership law, however, is an
effort to shape these relationships by assigning certain rights and duties even in the face of uncertainty about the parties’ intentions. The corporation—with its need for state approval, its particularized
form, and its limited liability for shareholders—is perhaps the least contractual. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of the “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1141–42 (2011).
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would seem appropriate for the theory of the firm to speak to the purpose
of corporations, as an important subcategory. Coase focuses on the employer−employee relationship and does not mention shareholders or the
corporate form. Alchian and Demsetz place the firm at the center of team
production, with shareholders as one of the many groups providing inputs. In fact, Alchian and Demsetz specifically question the very idea of
shareholder governance:
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is
one emanating from the division of ownership among several people, or is it that the collection of investment funds from people of
various anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom voting
rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should
reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why voting rights in any of
the outside, participating investors?71

The transaction costs and property rights theories do lend themselves to a
concern for shareholder protection. Both identify vulnerable groups
among those who provide inputs and attempt to create structures that
protect them from hold up or exploitation. The transaction-costs school
has focused on incomplete contracts and the need for firm governance to
resolve the ex post distributional difficulties. The property-rights school
has focused on the property at the core of the firm, and those who hold it,
as the most likely of the groups to need control rights. Both of these approaches could justify placing shareholders at the center of the firm, in
order to permit them to gain corresponding economic advantage in the
face of contractual uncertainty and property-rights weakness. But compelling cases could also be made for employees, suppliers, and customers
as the parties who—in various types of situations—would be the most
vulnerable or most in need of protection from other players.72
The economic literature on the theory of the firm should be attractive to scholars looking to push into new frontiers in corporate law because it has the imprimatur of the current corporate law establishment,
and yet is relatively underexplored. Perhaps more fundamentally, the
theory of the firm asks foundational questions—primarily, why we have
legally created firms in the first place. As Jill Fisch has persuasively argued, empirical scholars who base their studies on share-related value
“have not yet made the case” that societal efficiency is best reflected in

71. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 54, at 789 n.14.
72. See Blair, supra note 60; see also David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-In and the Theory of
the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429 (2012) (arguing for governance rights for customers, based
on sunk costs and concerns over opportunism).
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the maximization of shareholder wealth.73 The best opportunity for delving into these fundamental premises lies with the theory of the firm literature.
IV. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM IN CORPORATE LAW
Many scholars have used the theory of the firm literature in their
discussions of corporate law, and citations to Coase, Alchian and
Demsetz, and Williamson are fairly abundant. But three examples of this
research have developed distinct theories of the firm that have garnered
substantial traction within the academy: the nexus-of-contracts theory,
the director primacy theory of Stephen Bainbridge, and the team production model of Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout.74 These examples use the
theory of the firm research in a sustained effort to develop a model of the
corporation. These three explorations are discussed further below.
A. Nexus of Contracts
The nexus-of-contracts theory has been extremely influential in
shaping corporate law theory over the past three decades.75 It has driven
corporate law theorists to emphasize the non-mandatory nature of corporate law—both as a descriptive and a normative manner—and it has
counseled against changes to the status quo based on the contractual nature (and arguable Pareto optimality) of that status quo.76 However, as
73. Fisch, supra note 29, at 640.
74. Andrew Gold has used shareholder primacy, director primacy, and team production as
three examples of theories of the firm in corporate law. Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and
Judicial Uncertainty, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1087 (2012). This Essay focuses on nexus of contracts
rather than shareholder primacy, as that theory is more closely associated with the theory of the firm
literature.
This focus on the three theories is not meant to exclude the other insightful works of scholarship
that have analyzed corporate law using the theory of the firm literature. Many of them have been
cited already within this Essay. See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 67; McInerney, supra
note 46; Meurer, supra note 9. While these works constitute the literature upon which I hope scholars will draw more substantially in the future, they have not yet attained the same level of recognition within the field, nor (in some cases) do they purport to develop a new theory of the corporation.
I am partial to the employee primacy model of the firm proposed by Brett McDonnell, but I leave it
for the “future developments” portion of this Essay. See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 335 (2008) (“I challenge shareholder primacy as the appropriate model for corporate law, arguing instead for employee
primacy in corporate decision-making.”).
75. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991) (discussing the corporate contract); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of
the corporation in legal scholarship is the so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Thomas S. Ulen,
The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318–27 (1993) (discussing the importance and impact of the nexus-of-contracts theory).
76. Ulen supra note 75, at 322–23 (discussing the overall impact of the theory).
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noted earlier, the nexus-of-contracts theory is something of an “antitheory” of the firm. It explains why firms are not necessary, rather than
why they exist. Unlike Alchian and Demsetz’s firm—which plays a real
role in shaping, executing, and enforcing contracts with input providers—the “nexus” at the center of Jensen & Meckling’s firm is a mere
legal fiction that is “not an individual” and has no real independent existence.77 Jensen and Meckling’s model focuses on agency costs created by
the upper-level managers who are tasked to do the bidding of principals.
Their theory defines agency costs as the costs associated with monitoring
by the principal, bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual
loss.78 The monitoring they describe looks a lot like the “control” that
Coase focused on as the key element in defining the firm.79 But Jensen
and Meckling turn their attention to the relationship between shareholders (principals) and management (agents), rather than the relationship of
employees to the firm. Their model joins the financial structure of the
firm with the management structure of corporate governance.
As other commentators have pointed out, the nexus of contract theory is thus not really a theory of the firm at all. Rather, it is a theory of
agency costs within a certain type of firm—namely, the corporation.80
And upon close examination, it falls apart, at least as a theory of the firm,
or as a justification for the corporation in the first place. If a corporation
is really no more than a nexus of contracts, then there should be no need
for corporations or corporate law. For if firms are not necessary, there is
no need for the law to create and support them. Recognizing this fact,81
proponents of the nexus-of-contract theory make two arguments to salvage the theory as both a descriptive matter and a normative prescrip-

77. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 23, at 311.
78. Id. at 308.
79. And indeed, Jensen and Meckling observe in a footnote: “As it is used in this paper the
term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules etc.” Id. at 308 n.9.
80. Hart, supra note 46, at 1763–65; Meuer, supra note 9, at 732; Rock & Wachter, supra note
46, at 1624; David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law after Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 105 n.277 (2003) (“So for Coase, in the first instance, the firm is
anything but a nexus of contracts. Instead the firm is a site where the costs of continuous contracting
(forming a market) outweigh the costs of forming the entity. Ironies abound in the legal academy’s
appreciation of the great economist.”).
81. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 75, at 1417–18, 1444–45 (acknowledging that
statutory corporate law is necessary to create a corporation); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law,
and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (1989)
(“Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation codes and other sources of law contain many
mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around . . . . [T]o claim that contractarians would deny
the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse them of blindness or stupidity.”).
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tion.82 First, contractarians argue that the corporation is primarily contractual, and therefore, it represents terms that the parties have freely
chosen for themselves. Moreover, because the terms have been freely
chosen, we can presume they are efficient.83 This claim leads to the normative perspective that because the corporation is merely an intersection
of voluntary agreements, corporate law should facilitate freedom of contract and eschew mandatory rules.84 But such a norm—taken to its logical extreme—would eliminate corporate law, at least in terms of any
mandatory rules. Therefore, some contractarians suggest that corporate
law should provide default or even mandatory terms in situations when
the terms are approximations of the will of the parties—or more controversially, where the terms would lead to more efficient results.85
Thus, the nexus-of-contract theory has taken on a life of its own
outside of the theory of the firm and has served as both a descriptive
model and a normative prescription for corporate law scholars. As has
been repeatedly recognized, however, the nexus-of-contracts approach is
not a theory of the firm because it “says nothing about why firms exist or

82. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later,
31 J. CORP. L. 779, 783 (2006) (“Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory of corporate law is both normative and positive: that corporate law should take this form; and that it ‘almost always’ does.”).
83. A more nuanced version of this would be to have the parties choose their terms is the system most likely to lead to an efficient result over time.
84. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860 (1997) (“The nexus of contracts model has important implications for a range of corporate law topics, the most obvious of
which is the debate over the proper role of mandatory legal rules.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1397
(1989) (“[Corporate law contractarians argue] that the contractual view of the corporation implies
that the parties involved should be totally free to shape their contractual arrangements.”).
85. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel argue:
Thus, the purpose of corporate law is to fill in or even require certain provisions within
the corporate contract, as long as those provisions are our best guess as to what the parties would have contracted for ex ante, had they the information and foresight to do so.
Why not just abolish corporate law and let people negotiate whatever contracts they
please? The short but not entirely satisfactory answer is that corporate law is a set of
terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of
contracting. There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, establishing quorums, and so
on, that almost everyone will want to adopt. Corporate codes and existing judicial decisions supply these terms “for free” to every corporation, enabling the venturers to concentrate on matters that are specific to their undertaking.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1444
(1989). For a critique of this approach as “inconsistent with the contract theory of the corporation,”
see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the AntiContractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990) (contending that “it is one thing to propound a default rule to cover situations not covered in the parties’ contract, and another thing to state a general
rule applicable irrespective of contract”).
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what kind of activity is undertaken by a certain firm.”86 Ultimately, other
developments in the theory of the firm literature have more to add when
it comes to these foundational topics.
B. Director Primacy
Stephen Bainbridge has drawn upon the theory of the firm and public choice literature in creating his director primacy theory of the corporation.87 Bainbridge’s model splits the theory of the firm question into
two components: What are the ends for which the corporation exists, and
what are the means of achieving those ends?88 For the theory of shareholder primacy, shareholders represent both the ends and the means of
governance.89 Bainbridge agrees that the goal of the corporation should
be shareholder wealth maximization.90 He believes, however, that control
of the corporation rests not with the shareholders but rather with the
board of directors who serves as the “Platonic guardian” of the firm.91
Bainbridge’s theory is thus an amalgam of shareholder primacy and
nexus-of-contracts theory but with important differences. Rather than
saying that the firm is itself a nexus of contracts, he argues that the firm
has a nexus of its contracts, and that the board is that nexus.92 According
to Bainbridge, the defining characteristic of a firm is “the existence of a
central decision-maker vested with the power of fiat.”93 Rather than being participatory democracies, firms provide for hierarchies that can direct the allocation of resources through command.94 Bainbridge bases his
theory on Coase’s differentiation between markets and firms, as well as
86. Meurer, supra note 9, at 731–32 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited,
in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson &
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991)).
87. Bainbridge’s theory was developed over time through a series of articles on the subject. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 547, 573 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; see also Bainbridge, supra
note 75; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV.
601 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Voting Rights]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Primacy in Takeovers]. He
synthesized his research into a book on the subject. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).
88. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 547–50.
89. Id. at 573 (“[S]hareholder primacy embraces two principles: (1) the shareholder wealth
maximization norm . . . and (2) the principle of ultimate shareholder control.”).
90. Id. at 563.
91. Id. at 550–51, 560 (also referring to the board as a “sui generis body”); Bainbridge, supra
note 75, at 33.
92. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 554–60.
93. Id. at 555.
94. Id.
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the notion that “firms arise when it is possible to lower these sets of costs
inherent to team production by delegating to a team member the power to
direct how the various inputs will be utilized by the firm.”95 Drawing
upon Arrow’s The Limits of Organization,96 he contrasts consensusbased decision-making structures with authority-based structures, and
argues that the corporation fits Arrow’s model of an authority-based system.97 The board of directors serves as the ultimate seat of authority—the
central decision-maker that contracts with all other players and directs
them within the firm.
The director primacy theory has both positive and normative components.98 As a matter of description, Bainbridge contends that the director-centered model of the firm matches both modern corporate practice
and the structure of most state law (particularly Delaware, the dominant
model).99 As a normative matter, he argues that director primacy is superior to shareholder control because shareholders lack the information
necessary to make informed decisions about the firm, as well as the financial interest in obtaining such information.100 According to Bainbridge, “Active investor involvement in corporate decision-making
seems likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the widely held
public corporation practicable: namely, the centralization of essentially
non-reviewable decision-making authority in the board of directors.”101
He also argues that shareholder wealth maximization has become the
dominant norm in business and in law, and that this norm is optimal because it reflects the hypothetical bargain that the parties would achieve in
a world without transaction costs.102 The other stakeholders would be
willing to pay less for control, according to the hypothetical bargain, because they are better protected by contracts and welfare legislation. As a
result, shareholders would efficiently bargain to be the sole recipients of
the residual profits of the firm.103

95. Id. at 556 (citing to the “Coasean theory of the firm”).
96. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974).
97. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 557–58.
98. Id. at 591−92; see Charles R. T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern
Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 774 (2006) (describing director primacy as “both a normative and
predictive theory: Directors should manage and control the corporation; directors do manage and
control the corporation”).
99. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 568–74. For an extensive discussion of the
role of director primacy within the law, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 105–53.
100. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 202–03, 233–35. Bainbridge also argues that shareholder
control can lead to rent-seeking by certain shareholders. Id. at 228–32.
101. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 87, at 1749.
102. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 577–83.
103. Id.
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Bainbridge uses the theory of the firm literature to establish the basics of his model (as a combination of contracts and hierarchy) and then
to defend its particular configuration of authority and purpose. It is arguably a continuation of Coase’s original insight regarding firms, further
elaborated with the “hypothetical bargain” used in law and economics
analyses. Ultimately, however, Bainbridge fails to flesh out his theory
sufficiently to justify the near absolute control he provides to the board.
He repeatedly relies on Arrow’s contrast between consensus and authority to resolve any questions of power allocation in favor of stronger authority. This move—characterized by Brett McDonnell as Bainbridge’s
“Arrowian moment”—is the crux of his model.104 But as McDonnell
points out, Arrow’s description of the tradeoff between authority and
accountability does not resolve all policy questions in favor of authority.105 Ultimately, Arrow’s dichotomy—and by extension, the director
primacy model—is “not able to tell us whether reform in favor of somewhat more accountability at the expense of some, but far from total, loss
in authority is a good idea or not.”106
Bainbridge’s use of Coase, Arrow, and the theory of the firm moves
the ball significantly when it comes to our conceptions of the modern
corporation.107 His director primacy theory has been influential in academic, practitioner, and judicial circles.108 His insightful but limited use
of theory of the firm principles demonstrates the opportunity for their
further development in corporate law.
C. Team Production
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout drew extensively from the theory of
the firm literature in developing their team production theory of corporate law.109 Like nexus-of-contract and director primacy theories, the
team production model views the firm as a series of relationships be104. Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The
New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 143 (2009).
105. Id. at 161. McDonnell considers various arguments for Bainbridge’s allocation of power
but ultimately finds none of them to solve the dilemma. Id. at 162–85.
106. Id. at 143.
107. Id. at 142 (noting that Bainbridge’s “extensive reliance” on Arrow is “on its own, a great
service”).
108. See, e.g., In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 367 n.94 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(citing Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, for the proposition that “the law requires and
encourages director involvement”); Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the
Function of Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 511, 514 (2004) (“For the most part, director primacy
is descriptively accurate and offers a compelling normative justification for why the board, and not
the shareholders or the courts, should be the institution that decides what a corporation does.”).
109. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 313 (1999).
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tween various constituencies.110 These relationships result in the joint
production of goods or services. And, as in director primacy theory, the
board of directors serves as the ultimate authority when it comes to assigning responsibilities, mediating disputes, and divvying up the profits.111 Unlike Bainbridge or shareholder primacy theorists, however, Blair
and Stout do not argue that shareholder wealth maximization should be
the goal of the corporation. Instead, the corporation consists of all stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise, and the
directors owe a duty to all of these participants in the corporate enterprise.112 According to the model, these stakeholders contribute their resources to the enterprise with the implicit bargain that the enterprise itself will fairly apportion the responsibilities and rewards. The board is
hired by these stakeholders to serve as the apportioning body. The board
thus serves the stakeholders’ interests as a group, but it must have authority over them in order to carry out its function.113
Blair and Stout’s team production model draws extensively on the
theory of the firm literature. Their analysis opens with the question,
“Why do firms exist?”114 and discusses the principal-agent and propertyrights approaches on its way to developing the team production model.115
In focusing on the lateral interactions between different stakeholders,
Blair and Stout draw extensively on the work of Alchian and Demsetz in
conceptualizing the firm as a method for coordinating production.116 At
the same time, they criticize that model for taking “a potentially rich story about economic gains from horizontal interaction among team members and, by reducing the team members to interchangeable parts that
make no firm-specific investment, reformulat[ing] the team production
problem as a vertical principal-agent problem.”117 They then move on to
consider the work of Holmstrom,118 Tirole,119 and Rajan and Zingales120
in developing their own team production model of corporate law. Their
model emphasizes that the team in effect hires the board, rather than the
110. Id. at 254 (stating that the team production approach is “consistent with the ‘nexus of
contracts’ approach”).
111. Id. at 251.
112. Id. at 253.
113. Id. at 280–81.
114. Id. at 257.
115. Id. at 257–61; see also id. at 261–65 (developing a “grand-design principal-agent model,”
which represents the conventional model of the firm).
116. Id. at 265 (citing Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 54).
117. Id. at 267.
118. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982).
119. Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 181 (1986).
120. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 61.
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other way around, and that the team members all plan to share in the
fruits of the joint production. As Blair and Stout describe it, “the public
corporation is not so much a ‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as
a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments,’ in which several different groups
contribute unique and essential resources to the corporate enterprise, and
who each find it difficult to protect their contribution through explicit
contracts.”121 The board serves as a group of “mediating hierarchs” who
manage the relationships of various corporate constituencies.122
Like Bainbridge, Blair and Stout endeavor for their model to serve
both descriptive and normative purposes.123 They argue that the teamproduction model better mirrors the law’s approach to the corporation, as
in practice directors are largely left alone to manage the affairs of the
corporation.124 Unlike director primacy, however, the team production
model requires the board to serve all stakeholders, rather than shareholders alone. They argue that this is both a better description—as, in practice, boards balance concerns among various constituencies—and a superior normative approach. The team production model offers incentives
for all members of the team to participate, and thereby “more accurately
captures the fundamental contracting problem corporation law attempts
to resolve.”125
Blair and Stout’s team production model, rooted in the work of
Alchian and Demsetz, and Rajan and Zingales, can be seen as the foundational work for a new school of corporate law and economics based on
the theory of the firm. But as important as this work is, it would be a mistake to think that the team production model represents the alpha through
omega in terms of the contributions that the theory of the firm can make.
I would prefer to think of it as the alpha. The following Part explores
where we might be headed.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE THEORY OF THE FIRM IN CORPORATE LAW
The theory of the firm is firmly engrained in the corporate law literature. Now is not the time to shunt it aside in favor of event studies. Instead, corporate law scholars should explore additional opportunities to
delve into this research. Two ideas regarding the potential for further
exploration are discussed below: the role of employees in corporate law,
121. Blair & Stout, supra note 109, at 275.
122. Id. at 250.
123. Id. at 289.
124. Id. at 287–319.
125. Id. at 328. For a critique of the exclusion of non-shareholder representatives on Blair &
Stout’s board of directors, see Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and
the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2115−16 (2010).
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and the potential for further connections between legal scholars and interdisciplinary research.
A. Employees and the Theory of the Firm
Employees play a central role in the theory of the firm literature.
Although the neoclassical firm was largely undefined, employees and
capital assets were considered to be inside the firm, while customers and
suppliers were outside.126 In The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase singled out the relationship between the firm and its employees as the firm’s
defining feature.127 The firm-based (as opposed to market-based) transactions described by Coase involve the purchase of labor for a particular
endeavor or ongoing concern. In explaining these transactions, Coase
states: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he
does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was
ordered to do so.”128 The firm’s reason for existing outside of the market
is the relationship between the entrepreneur-coordinator and the employee. Coase finds empirical support for this conclusion in the law, as he
argues that “[w]e can best approach the question of what constitutes a
firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that
of ‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”129 He then quotes
at length from a treatise concerning the common law “control” test,
which provides that “[t]he master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally or by another servant or agent.”130 He concludes: “We thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of
the legal concept of ‘employer and employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was developed above.”131
Although the subsequent theory of the firm literature has not been
as explicitly employee-centric, it has generally concurred regarding the
importance of employees to the firm. Alchian and Demsetz, for example,
define the purpose of the firm as team production that is “production in
which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a
sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”132 Given the difficulty of measuring individual contributions to productivity in joint production, the core problem of the firm is to make sure contributors do not
shirk their responsibilities to the team. Such concerns obviously apply to
126. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 46, at 1631.
127. Coase, supra note 8, at 387, 403–05.
128. Id. at 387.
129. Id. at 403.
130. Id. at 404.
131. Id.
132. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 54, at 779.
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employees. In the transaction-costs model, firms are designed to prevent
or mitigate ex post opportunism by the parties. The value that employees
contribute to the firm—often described as “human capital”—may be
transferable, such as education or general skills, or may be specific to the
firm. To the extent an employee has invested in firm-specific skills, she
is subject to opportunistic behavior because she has little leverage to get
the full value of those skills.133 The property-rights model is also concerned with the relationship of employees to the firm. Although the
property rights discussed in the model are generally nonhuman assets,
the assets are “the glue that keeps the firm together.”134 Thus, the property-rights theory of the firm is designed in part to explain why the firm’s
employees remain with the firm.135
Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even further.
Gorga and Halberstam’s knowledge-based theory of the firm is based on
“[t]he way the firm develops the knowledge it will use in its production
process and the extent that firm can bind this knowledge to its structure
will influence its organizational structure.”136 The knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute, and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm. The primary generators of
this knowledge are employees. Similarly, McInerney’s capability-based
theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific knowledge and learning that
can be translated into joint production, emphasizing the role of employees as holders of the firm’s capabilities.137 Rajan and Zingales’s “access”
model of power within the firm defines a firm “both in terms of unique
assets (which may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who
have access to these assets.”138 An employee uses her access to these
133. As Margaret Blair has pointed out, “The tendency of the transactions costs literature has
been to recognize that firm-specific human capital raises similar questions, but then to sidestep the
implications of these questions for corporate governance.” Blair, supra note 60, at 66.
134. HART, supra note 59, at 57.
135. Hart poses the following hypothetical: if firm 1 acquires firm 2, what is to stop workers at
former firm 2 from quitting and forming a new entity?
For firm 1’s acquisition of firm 2 to make any economic sense, there must be some
source of firm 2 value over and above the workers’ human capital, i.e. some ‘glue’ holding firm 2’s workers in place. The source of value may consist of as little as a place to
meet; the firm’s name, reputation, or distribution network; the firm’s files, containing
important information about its operations or its customers; or a contract that prohibits
firm 2’s workers from working for competitors or from taking existing clients with them
when they quit . . . . [W]ithout something holding the firm together, the firm is just a
phantom.
Id. But cf. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 61, at 388 (“The property rights view does not consider
employees part of the firm because, given that employees cannot be owned, there is no sense in
which they are any different from agents who contract with the firm at arm’s length.”).
136. Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 67, at 1140.
137. McInerney, supra note 46, at 139.
138. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 61, at 390.
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unique assets to “specialize her human capital to the resource and make
herself valuable.”139 Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince the amount of
surplus that she gets from this power is often more contingent on her
making the right specific investment than the surplus that comes from
ownership, access can be a better mechanism to provide incentives than
ownership.”140 The role of the firm is to allocate access efficiently among
the firm’s agents.141
The focus of the theory of the firm literature on the firm as a whole,
and especially its focus on employees within the firm, stands in stark
contrast to corporate law where employees are nowhere to be found. The
primary players in corporate law are shareholders, directors, and officers,
sometimes described as “management”.142 More recently, gatekeepers
such as accountants, lawyers, and compensation consultants have taken
on more specific and significant roles in the structure of corporate governance. Employees, however, have remained off the corporate law radar.143 As someone who believes that employees can and should play
meaningful roles in corporate governance,144 the theory of the firm literature supports the notion that employees are critical to our definition of
the firm. Their importance to the firm, and relative unimportance to corporate law, is the source of some dissonance that needs to be addressed.
B. Making New Connections
As Romano noted in After the Revolution in Corporate Law, the
law and economics movement in corporate law produced “one of the
more interdisciplinary fields of law.”145 Although the interdisciplinary
study of law has a hoary tradition,146 it is perhaps even more popular than
ever before.147 The injection of a rigorously produced methodology into
the formerly staid confines of corporate law is, according to Romano, the
reason for the field’s transformation. Rather than simply relying on doc139. Id. at 388.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 391.
142. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93 (1986).
143. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 283
(1998).
144. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The
Case for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
871 (2007).
145. Romano, supra note 1, at 342.
146. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962−1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
147. See David A. Hollander, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: What Can We Learn from
Princeton’s Long-Standing Tradition?, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 771, 773 (2007) (“The increasingly interdisciplinary nature of law scholarship and law practice is both long and well documented.”).
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trine developed through case law and doctrinal analysis, law and economics scholars could apply a new form of analysis that had the support
of complex theory and empirical findings. It enabled the new breed of
scholars to speak with authority and, at times, contempt for those unfamiliar with the new approach.148 This interdisciplinary approach was the
key to the revolution.
At this point in the revolution, however, the interdisciplinary approach has become somewhat constrained. Romano’s view is that the
field has become less a “law and economics” collaboration than a law
and finance one. She counsels prospective business law scholars to pursue a law and finance PhD rather than an economics PhD, because graduate economics programs have focused too much on theory and mathematical modeling. Romano also contends that “there is a consensus on
ends, as there is among most U.S. corporate law scholars . . . (a consensus that the objective of public, for-profit corporations is to maximize
shareholder wealth).”149 This constricted view of interdisciplinarity is, in
fact, evidence that the field is ripe for another transformation. Finance
continues to contribute significantly to corporate law. But it seems counter to the original interdisciplinary spirit of the revolution to circumscribe
corporate law so narrowly. The tunnel vision of the law and finance approach threatens to return corporate law to the “ossified, stagnant field”
that law and economics scholars themselves transformed.

148. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 1, at 343–44 (describing the preexisting doctrinal approach
as “an ossified, stagnant field” and “intellectual vacuousness”). Fred McChesney used a colonization
metaphor to describe this strategic advantage for those proficient in law and economics:
As American history demonstrates, the colonization of one territory by inhabitants of another creates at least two problems. First, the colonizers and colonized usually do not
speak the same language, and thus must learn to communicate. Ordinarily, the language
of the colonizers comes to dominate, a development rarely pleasing to the colonized. Second, patterns of property ownership will likely be disrupted, as colonizers acquire (often
by force) rights previously held by the colonized.
The colonization of some fields of law by economic analysis fits this historical pattern. Economics provides a powerful “tool kit” with which to analyze law. It has proven
difficult, however, for some adherents of more traditional approaches to law to come to
understand the different form of analysis that the use of economic methods entails. Moreover, the economic approach has reduced the value of lawyers’ more traditional but less
powerful methods of legal analysis. Not surprisingly, many lawyers have objected to the
intrusion of economic analysis into law on both grounds.
McChesney, supra note 81, at 1530.
149. Romano, supra note 1, at 356; see also Fisch, supra note 29, at 639 (noting the “explosion
of empirical analysis” and finding that “[e]mpirical scholars have embraced the [shareholder] primacy norm”).
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There is a wealth of new avenues for exploration in law through the
social sciences.150 But the different social science disciplines—
economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology—are increasingly borrowing from one another and bleeding into each other’s work. This
should not be surprising, as at root, these disciplines are about examining
and explaining human behavior. But with the blending will come conflict
and confusion. Law represents an ideal melting pot for many of these
concepts.151 Law relies on an understanding of human behavior to develop a legal system that regulates and motivates individuals within a social
structure. It thus need not cling to and defend a particular social science
methodology; it can instead select the best approaches and even combine
insights across disciplines.
Economics revolutionized the study of corporate law. It is now time
to continue and extend the revolution. We should branch out beyond finance to further consider the insights of the theory of the firm. Rather
than limiting the connections to finance departments, corporate law
scholars should look to management, strategy, and organization scholars
located in business schools, as well as in economics and sociology departments. Obviously, these connections have already begun in earnest,
as the Berle III Symposium demonstrates.152 But Romano’s narrative
threatens to marginalize this stream of research. The contributions of finance should not be allowed to overwhelm the continuing advances developed through the theory of the firm.
As noted earlier, with interdisciplinary cooperation comes the potential for conflict and confusion. This seems particularly likely when
working in the theory of the firm, which lacks a degree of the rigorous
border enforcement that financial economics has maintained. The ecumenical quality of the discipline can be a weakness if one is intent on
creating a coherent approach. Of course, it is also a strength, as it allows
for a variety of insights from a broad band of scholars. But if the theory
of the firm is to take root in corporate law beyond its current footholds,
academics across departments and graduate schools may need to commit
to stronger methodological assumptions or shared terminologies in order
150. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (discussing the “growing trend” and “increasing number” of law review
articles that use “social science—[and] psychology in particular—to inform legal theory”).
151. For example, the behavioral law and economics movement is at root an effort to import
key insights from social psychology into standard law and economics models. Christine Jolls, Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998).
152. Beyond the subject of the conference itself, it includes the work of business school scholars. See, e.g., Richard Marens, We Don’t Need You Anymore: Corporate Social Responsibilities,
Executive Class Interests, and Solving Mizruchi and Hirschman’s Paradox, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1189 (2012).
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to provide more continuity between projects. In order to convince others
to wade into new pools of research, it is helpful first to provide some
common ground. Otherwise, the exercise can seem boundless. One of the
reasons for the success of law and economics in corporate law is its uniform name, as well as its approachable and common concepts such as
agency costs, nexus of contracts, and shareholder primacy. These ideas
were complex enough to provide a competitive advantage to insiders,
while being simple enough to be used by a wide range of academics,
practitioners, and courts. Legal scholars interested in a theory of the firm
approach to corporate law may need to address this issue selfconsciously and be careful to coalesce around common terms and concepts, so the literature and discipline may grow more harmoniously and
efficiently.
Some of this dialogue is happening, particularly outside of law
schools. But my hope is that the work on the theory of the firm will become more accessible and commonplace to the average U.S. corporate
law scholar—beyond Jensen and Meckling. One possibility includes
closer ties with new institutional economics (NIE).153 As a matter of nomenclature, I confess to some confusion about the differences between
new institutional economics, transaction-cost economics, and the theory
of the firm, as the term “new institutional economics” is attributed to
Williamson, the progenitor of the transaction-costs theory of the firm.154
Regardless, the International Society for New Institutional Economics
(ISNIE) would appear to be a congenial place for corporate law scholars
to convene with academics working on the theory of the firm at business
schools and social science departments.155
It is the potential for interdisciplinary connections that provides
perhaps the most excitement for corporate law academics contemplating
the theory of the firm literature. The wealth of scholarship upon which
the field can draw provides a potent contrast to the narrowness of the
current corporate law literature, resting as it does primarily on empirical
financial research. Moreover, in an era where the traditional corporate
153. The field is described as “an interdisciplinary enterprise combining economics, law, organization theory, political science, sociology and anthropology to understand the institutions of
social, political and commercial life.” Peter G. Klein, New Institutional Economics, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 456, 456 (Boidewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=115811.
154. See id. at 457 (citing WILLIAMSON, supra note 22).
155. ISNIE’s mission statement is as follows: “ISNIE encourages rigorous theoretical and
empirical investigation of these topics using approaches drawn from economics, organization theory,
law, political science, and other social sciences. The Society makes a special effort to encourage
participation from scholars around the world, with membership from over 46 countries. ISNIE is
committed to young scholars as well as those from developing and transitional economies.” About
ISNIE, ISNIE, http://www.isnie.org/about.html (last visited May 15, 2012).
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law has become more federalized, and alternatives to the corporation are
becoming more popular,156 it makes sense to reexamine the root question
as the base of our system of corporate law: Why firms? The theory of the
firm promises the best opportunity to begin this inquiry in earnest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Berle III Symposium demonstrates the potential for corporate
law scholars to engage with the theory of the firm on broader and deeper
levels. My contribution to the conference is simply an extended argument for this engagement to continue. Empirical research into the effects
of laws, regulations, and corporate governance practices on stock prices
offers important insights into corporate law’s financial ramifications. But
much remains to be mapped in our thinking about the social and legal
construction of organizations, particularly business organizations. The
theory of the firm literature offers a terrific base for legal scholars to start
and extend their explorations.

156. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010).

